United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPELLEE'S BRIEF

741777

To be argued by PAUL D. VEXLER

12-30-76

In the

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

ESTHER PRIEDLANDER as Surviving Executrix of the Estate of Raphdel Cohen,

Plaintiff-Appellant

-egelast-

PETER I. PRIMERO, BAGUEL SOKOL, MESS & ENAPP.
INC., LOUIS ADER, MARVEN GREENSPAN, VIGLIAM
ZEGKENDORS, ZEGKENDORF HOTELS CORPORATION,
DRAKE ASSOCIATES, ALWED KAPLAN, DONAK
SECURITERS CORP., AGRIN LAVSON & MOLLAND and
HARRIS, KERR, MORSTER & COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from Order of the United States District

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PAUL, METSS, RIPKIND, WHARROW & GARRISON Attorner for Defendant Appelled Villiam Reckendorf

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In The

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

ESTHER FRIEDLANDER as Surviving Executrix of the Estate of Raphael Cohen,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-against-

: No. 74-1777

PETER I. FEINBERG, SAMUEL SOKOL, WEBB & KNAPP, INC., LOUIS ADLER, MARVIN GREENSPAN, WILLIAM ZECKENDORF, ZECKENDORF HOTELS CORPORATION, DRAKE ASSOCIATES, ALFRED KAPLAN, DOMAX SECURITIES CORP., AGRIN LAWSON & HOLLAND and HARRIS, KERR, FORSTER & COMPANY

Defendants-Appellees,

On Appeal from an Order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE WILLIAM ZECKENDORF

Introductory Statement

Appellee William Zeckendorf ("Zeckendorf") submits

The Record on Appeal erroneously states that the attorneys for William Zeckendorf also represent Webb & Knapp, Inc., and Zeckendorf Hotels Corporation.

this brief in opposition to plaintiff-appellant's appeal from the order of the District Court dated and entered on April 22, 1974 (A-217) denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for class designation.

To avoid needless expenditure of the Court's time in reading (uplicative briefs, Zeckendorf adopts, in full, the brief filed on behalf of appellees Peter I. Feinberg, Domax Securities Corp. and Drake Associates ("Feinberg Appellees").

The restraining order issued by the Bankruptcy
Court with respect to Zeckendorf is discussed at length in
plaintiff's brief. As the order relates primarily to Zeckendorf,
we submit the following point as a supplement to the brief
of the Feinberg Appellees.

The Zeckendorf Restraining Order Does Not Excuse Plaintiff's Neglect

The thrust of plaintiff's argument is that its neglect in prosecuting this purported class action is excused by the dilatory behavior of defendants. In particular, plaintiff claims that it could not pursue this case because of the restraining order issued by the Bankruptcy Court in a chapter XI proceeding involving defendant Zeckendorf (A-56).

Judge Ward's opinion below makes it clear that the restraining order did not excuse the dilatory conduct of plaintiff. While such order would necessarily cause plaintiff some inconvenience and, perhaps, additional work in the early stages of this case, it certainly does not justify plaintiff's total failure to act in the matter. Plaintiff could have, and should have, sought to obviate the effects of the stay, yet did not do so. Plaintiff's failure to take any action, either through ignorance or choice, only serves to underscore the wisdom of Judge Ward's decision.

Plaintiff's most obvious course would have been to apply in the Bankruptcy Court -- as is often done -- for a vacation or modification of the stay order, so as to permit continued prosecution of the action to judgment against Zeckendorf or, alternatively against at least the other defendants. If such motion was granted, plaintiff could have vigorously prosecuted all or the main part of this action.

Indeed, there is every reason to believe such a motion by plaintiff would have been successful. Bankruptcy restraining orders are designed to stay two types of proceedings: (1) in rem suits by creditors which interfere

with assets within the custody of the Bankruptcy Court; and (2) in personam suits against the bankrupt which seriously interfere with the administration of the estate. See, Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) ¶ 2.61, at 327-328 (1974). This lawsuit does not seem to fit into either of these categories. It is an in personam suit that, in light of Zeckendorf's peripheral position as a defendant, could hardly have been considered a serious interference with the administration of the estate. Therefore, it is likely that, upon proper application, the Bankruptcy Judge would have lifted the stay and allowed the case to proceed.

But, plaintiff never made that application - an omission which, in and of itself, is ample support for the District Court's decision.

Moreover, yet another course was available to plaintiff which was simply ignored. Plaintiff could have discontinued the action as against Mr. Zeckendorf, while prosecuting the action against the other defendants. At a later date, without any prejudice to his case, plaintiff could have reinstituted the suit against Zeckendorf. At one point, plaintiff wrote to Zeckendorf's counsel (A-60) indicating that he would, in fact, pursue this course in order to move this case forward. Yet, plaintiff never

attempted to effect the discontinuance and Zeckendorf's counsel heard nothing more of the matter for almost three years.

Clearly, the restraining order was not responsible for this delay. Only plaintiff is to blame.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff cannot rely on the bankruptcy restraining order to excuse its neglect in prosecuting this action. The order of the District Court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee William Zeckendorf 345 Park Avenue New York, New York 10022

Of Counsel:

Robert L. Laufer Paul D. Wexler DEC 3 3 18/14

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